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Case No. 807 4 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
,STATE \OF UTAH 
LORETTA E.ARLE·Y, for herself and 
on behalf of JoANNE L. MciN-
~TYRE, S·HARON MciNTYRE and 
·CAROL MciNTYRE., minor chil-
'dren of JACK J. MciNT·YRE, 
DEC'EAS,ED, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, T. K. PYM, doing business 
as CERTIFIED DECTECTIVE 
AGE.NC;Y and CONTINENTAL 
c:ASUALTY C.OMPANY, 
Deferndants. 
PLAINTIF'F:S' BRIEF 
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
lG' l 1f A l4"( ~ jHA.RttiS.TENSfENP, l . t 'ff 2\. · ~"-' ~-~ 1L. -~ .·~~·-· · - orneys or a~n ~ s, 
A(.; ~.:: ·2 ri 1 ~ E~ 3 433 Judge Building, 
·- ' - ·-·-·- ---·-. ----·-·~·" .. 
__ Salt Lake City, Utah. 
- 0-""ftrpe ('g, .. -rc-- r:~ I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
PRELIMINARY STATE ME NT -------------------------------------------------- 1 
FACTS ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 
POINTS TO BE ARGUED ------------------------------------------------------------ 4 
ARGUMENT _____________________ --------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
CON CL U SI ON __________________________________________________________ ---------------------- 23 
CASES CITED 
Campton vs. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 106 Ut. 5'71, 151 Pac. 
( 2d) 18 9 ------------------------------------------------------------------.----------------- 13 
Diaz v. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 80 Ut. 77, 13 Pac. (2d) 307 __ 21 
Hancock v. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 58 Utah 192, 198 Pac. 
169 --------.--------------------.------ .. -------------------------------------------------------- 19 
Jones v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. (Ky.) 209 Ky. 643, 273 
s. w. 4 94 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17 
Larson v. Independent School Di,strict (Idaho) 22 Pac. 
( 2d) 299 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 17 
Llewelyn v. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 202 Pac. (2d) 160 __________ 14 
McGarry v. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 53 Ut. 81, 222 Pac. 592__ 6 
McGarry v. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 64 Ut. 592, 232 Pac. 
1090 ------------------------------------------------------------.------------------------------- 7 
Nordmark v. Indian Queen Hotel (Pa.) 104 Pa. Super. 139, 
159 A. 200· _____________________________________________________________ --------------------- 18 
Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 80 Ut. 301, 15 Pac. 
( 2d) 2 97 ------------------------... --- ... -.. -----...... -------------------------.--.. --.---- 11 
Utah Galena Corp v. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 78 Ut. 495, 
5 Pac. (2d) 242 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 
Wilson v. Hill (Del. Super) 71 A. 2d 425 ------------------------------------ 18 
SECTIONS CITED 
Sec. 35-1-71 U.C.A. 1953 ---------------------------------------------------------------- 4 
Sec. 3140, subsection 5, Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917______________ 10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORETTA EARLEY, for herself 
and on behalf of JoANNE L. Mc-
INTYRE, SHARON MciNTYRE and 
CAROL MciNTYRE, minor children 
of JACK J. MciNTYRE, DE-
CEASED, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs.-
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, T. K. PYM, doing business 
as CERTIFIED DETECTIVE 
AGENCY ~d CONTINENTAL 
CASUALTY COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
D·EF:ENDANTS·' BRIEF 
c·ase No. 807 4 
STATEMENT OF' FACTS 
On September 24, 1951, a person signing himself "J. 
1fclntyre" applied for and obtained employment with the 
defendant T. K. Pym, doing business as Certified De-
tective Agency. In his application for employment he 
listed himself as single, divorced, with no children, and 
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2 
stated that his father and mother \vere deceased, and that 
he had no brother or sister (R. 50). That person wa~ 
killed in the course of his employment Septe1nber 29, 
1951, four days later (R. 21, 22). 
The applicant and plaintiff, Loretta Earley, wa~ 
1narried to Jack James Mcintyre February 9·, 1937 in 
Reno, Nevada (R. 59), and as issue of this marriage there 
were born three children, JoAnne, born August 28, 1943, 
Sharon, born March 17, 1947, and Carol, born February 
9, 1948, all at Napa, California (R. 56-58, 33). The cor-
rect name of the man married by Mrs. Earley as Jack 
James Mcintyre was Jesse Eugene Connover (R. 37). 
Why he went under the assumed name does not appear 
from the record. 
Mrs. Earley claims that J. Mcintyre employed by 
T. K. Pym and her husband were one and the same per-
son. The only information she has that her husband is 
dead is that some ashes from a supposed cremation of a 
body were sent to Napa and her husband's father told her 
that they were the ashes of her husband and that he was 
dead, but the death certificate supposed to be the certi-
ficate for the cremated body states that the date of death 
of Jack James Mcintyre was September 9, 1951 (R. 39, 
63, 46 and 47). Various photographs were offered and 
identified by Mrs. Earley as pictures of her husband and 
she also stated that the signature on the application for 
employment was her husband's signature, and that the 
reason it is different than the one on the application for 
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her marriage license in Reno in 1937 ( R. 61) is because 
he \vas in a hurry when he signed the application for em-
ployment (R. 43). How she knows this does not appear 
from the record. 
For the last ten years of her marriage to Mcintyre 
Mrs. Earley lived with him in Napa, California (R·. 43). 
On May 1, 1951, Mcintyre left her and she never SR\V him 
again. A month later or on June 1, 1951, her attorney in 
Napa, California, filed an action seeking a divorce from 
Mcintyre on her behalf on the grounds of desertion (R. 
39, 40). She never heard fro1n him againt except once 
from R,eno when he wrote asking her to send him some 
1nechanics and carpenter tools, and instead of sending the 
tools she wrote him concerning the divorce and never re-
ceived an answer. After May 1, 1951 when Mcintyre left 
home he never sent any support for her or the children 
(R. 27, 34). Mrs. Earley is a trained psychiatric techni-
cian and employed in the County Hospital in Napa, Cali-
fornia from December, 1950 continuously, and was still 
so ernployed at the time of the hearing before the Utah 
Industrial Commission (R. 35-38). She started in at a 
salary of $180.00 a month and at the time of the hearing 
she \vas making $220.00 a month. She and Mcintyre to-
gether supported the family after her employment and 
until he left home, and after he left home and until her 
remarriage to Mr. Earley, she supported herself and the 
children, and since her marriage to Earley she and 
Earley are supporting herself and the children (R. 37-
39). 
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Mcintyre's mother asserted that before the re1nains 
were sent to Napa the wife remarried. Mrs. Earley was 
not positive of this because she did not ren1e1nber the 
burial date (R. 37), but she did marry Earley October 13, 
1951 in Napa, California, about two weeks after Septem-
ber 29 when she claims her husband was killed (R. 36, 
62). 
So far as the record discloses she made no effort 
to contact her husband, made no demands upon him for 
support for herself or children, and adequately supported 
the children and herself. There is no evidence whatever 
that either she or the children received, or e;xpected to 
receive, or needed to receive any financial help or assist-
ance from her absent husband. So far as is disclosed by 
the record, Mrs. Earley adequately supported herself and 
the children from May 1, 1951 until her marriage to 
Earley, and since that time she and Earley are support-
ing the children and herself. Mcintyre, her former hus-
band, just disappeared from her life, and so far as ap-
pears from the record she was content to allow him to 
do so, and never sought any support from him, even in 
her attempted divorce case. 
ARGUMENT 
Before the Industrial Commission defendants, Pym 
and Continental c·asualty Company, took the position 
that the person employed by Pym was not the husband 
or father of the applicants, and that in any event they 
were not his dependents at the time of his death. 
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The record is not very satisfactory. The death cer-
tificate sho,vs a death September 9, 1951, fifteen ( 15) 
days before the en1ployee went to work for us. The ap-
plicant, Loretta Earley, doesn't even know that her hus-
band is dead except that she received some of his per-
sonal effects and some ashes, supported by the death cer-
tificate stating death occurred September 9, which were 
buried at Napa, California, presumably as those of her 
husband. It does not appear how the deceased's father 
learned of his death or ho'v anyone knew that the person 
killed and cremated in South Dakota was or could be 
identified as Loretta Earley's former husband. Certainly 
no one learned of it through us because we didn't know 
that our employee was ma.rried or had a father or mother 
or any children. He was hired by us as a single man with-
out any dependents or relatives of any kind. He was 
with another of our employees at the time of his accident 
and so far as we kno'v this employee knows no more about 
him than we did. His widow says she had no knowledge 
of his whereabouts and yet promptly the deceased's ashes 
are sent to her at Napa, California, when neither we nor 
his associate at the time of his death knew anything about 
his Napa background. 
Likewise, the record is silent as to why Mcintyre left 
home apparently for no reason after fifteen (15) years 
of allegedly happy married life. His wife immediately 
begins divorce upon the ground of desertion, not non-
support, makes no effort to contact him, makes no de-
mand upon him for support for herself or her children, 
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apparently neither seeking nor desiring such support, 
and hardly is the deceased cold in his grave, and prob-
ably even before his ashes are received at Napa, she mar-
ries a man employed at the place where she is working and 
has been working for five ( 5) months prior to the de-
parture of the deceased from his home. The question na-
turally arises as to 'vhether or not Mr. Earley was the 
cause of Meintyre's leaving horne, and the reason why 
Mrs. Mcintyre was content to let him go and sought no 
support from him. In any event, by bringing her divorce 
action one month after Mcintyre left home and by re-
marrying probably even before his supposed ashes 
reached Napa, she clearlyindicated that she was through 
with Mcintyre and that Earley had replaced him in the 
lives of herself and her children. The record is clear and 
without dispute that neither she nor the children depend-
ed on Mcintyre or expected anything from him after 
May 1, 1951. The record is also clear that prior to May 
1, 19'51, and at least from the preceding December, she 
and the children were at least partially supported by 
her on earnings from the Napa County Hospital. 
In this state of the record, the Industrial Commission 
found that our deceased employee was the former hus-
band of Loretta Earley and the father of the minor ap-
plicants. How it could do so with the death certificate 
reading September 9, 1951, fifteen C15) days prior to the 
employment of Mcintyre by us is unexplained. The 
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Commission also found that there was no actual depend-
ency upon Mcintyre by either Mrs. Earley or her chil-
dren. 
Assuming that the law of California is the same as 
the law in Utah as to the obligation for support, we con-
tend that the Industrial Commission is right, and that 
applicants were not dependents of our employee at any 
time during his employment by us. 
In September of 1951, Section 42-1-67, U. C. A. 
1943, was in effect. It is identical with the present Sec-
tion 35-1-71 UCA, 1953, and provides as follows: 
"The following persons shall be presumed to 
be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased 
employee: 
(1) A wife upon a husband with whom she 
lives at the time of his death. 
(2) Children under the age of eighteen years 
or over such age, if physically or mentally incapa-
citated, upon the parent, with whom they are 
living at the time of the death of such parent, or 
who is legally bound for their support. 
"In all other cases, the question of depend-
ency, in whole or in part, shall be determined in 
accordance vvi th the facts in each particular case 
existing at the time of the injury resulting in the 
death of such ernployee, but no person shall be 
considered as dependent unless he is a member of 
the fami]y of the deceased employee, or bears to 
him the relation of husband or wife, lineal de-
scendant, ancestor, or brother or sister. The word 
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'child' as used in this title shall include a post-
hulnous child, and a child legally adopted prior to 
the injury. Half brothers and half sisters shall 
be included in the words 'brother or sister' as 
above used." 
Plaintiffs apparently make the contention that Sub-
divis~on (1) is not exclusive, and that a wife '\vho is not 
living with her husband at the time of his death may be 
sho'\vn to be a dependent, but that paragraph (2) is e;x-
clusive, and that children are dependents of the parent 
'\vho is legally bound for their support regardless of the 
facts. As we read the statute and under the interpreta-
tions given it by this court, neither '(1) nor (2) is exclu-
sive or conclusive. 
A presumption either of fact or law, is always re-
buttable. Buhler v. Mad:dison, 105 U. 39, 140 P. 2d, 933, 
109 U. 245, 166 P. 2d, 205. Chamberlain v. Larsen, 83 
Utah 420, 29 P. (2) 355. By using the word "presumed" 
in the statute, without the word "conclusive," the legis-
lature merely made it unnecessary for an applicant to 
offer proof as to children under 18 years of age, except 
the fact that the parent legally bound for their support 
was killed or injured by accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment. That fact alone is sufficient 
in the absence of any other evidence to allow a recovery. 
However, the presumption, as in the presumption of sani-
ty or innocence or title to real estate, whether it be one 
of law or fact, is always rebuttable. 
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In the case of People v. Fitzgerald, 58 P. 2d 718, the 
California Court points out that under the code of civil 
procedure a presumption not declared by law to be 
conclusive may be controverted by other evidence. See 
also Honrath v. New York L. Ins. Co., 275 N.W. 258 (N. 
D.) S.o far as we know the law is uniform. 
Plaintiffs in their Brief cite an Idaho Case, Larson 
v. Independent School Di.strict, 22 P. 2d 299, which illus-
trates the significance of the distinction between our stat-
ute and Idaho. The Idaho Statute says: "The following 
persons and they only shall be deemed dependents." No 
other persons are dependents, and by the use of the word 
"deemed" instead of "presumed", the Idaho Legislature 
created a conclusive presumption. To this effect is the 
California case of Irwin v. Pickwick Stages System., 25 
P. 2d, 998, where the California Court said that a conclu-
sive presumption is created by the words "shall be 
deemed". 
Our Legislature did not use the word "deemed", but 
used the word "presumed", so that while the Idaho Stat-
ute means conclusively presumed, our statute permits the 
presumption to be rebutted. 
We have found no decision in this court holding or 
even implying that the presumption of dependency is 
conclusive and not rebuttable. 
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In the case of Campton v. Industrial Commission of 
Ut.ah, 106 U. 571, 151 P. 2d 189, cited by plaintiffs, Judge 
Larson did say in his concurring opinion that he thought 
that these presumptions of dependency "are not rebut-
table, and the defense cannot be made that the husband 
or father did not in fact support them and thus escape 
the statutory payments." He, however, was the only 
Judge who even intimated that the presumption was not 
rebuttable. The decision itself in effect rebuts the pre-
sumption. In that case the father of the minor children 
was alive. No effort was made to require him to sup-
port them, although he was legally bound to do so. The 
children were members of the family of a man not their 
father with whom their mother was living at the time he 
was killed. c·ontrary to the claim of the applicants in this 
case that Subdivision (2) of the statute is exclusive, this 
court held that the children might recover under the last 
paragraph of the statute as members of the family of 
Campton regardless of the fact that they had living a 
father who was legally bound for their support. So ac-
tually the presumption was rebutted, and the way was 
open for a recovery against one not the father of the 
dependents. In its effect, that case is squarely against 
each of the contentions of the plaintiffs here. The pre-
sumption was rebutted and a recovery was allowed 
against someone other than the person legally bound for 
the support of the children. 
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We have no quarrel with any of the cases cited by 
the plaintiffs. Those from other states are controlled by 
their statutes and decisions. We have indicated in the 
case of Idaho there is a difference from our own. In addi-
tion to the Can1pton case, the plaintiff cites 
Diaz v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 80 U. 
77, '13 P. 2d, 307; 
Hancock v. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 58 Utah 
192, 198 Pac. 169·; 
Jones v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. (Ky.) 209 
Ky. 643, 273, S.W. 494; 
Larson v. Independent School District 
(Idaho) 22 Pac. (2d) 299; 
Llewelyn v. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 202 
Pac. (2d) 160; 
McGarry v. Industrial Comm .. (Utah) 53 Ut. 
81, 222 Pac. 592; 
McGarry v. Industrial Comm. (Utah) 64 Ut. 
592·, 2312 Pac. 1090; 
Nordmark v. Indian Queen Hotel (Pa.) 104 
Pa. Super. 139, 159 A. 200; 
Utah Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 80 Ut. 
301, 15 Pac. ( 2d) 297 ; 
Utah Galena Corp. v. Industrial Comm. 
(Utah) 78 Ut. 495, 5 Pac. (2d) 242·; 
Wilson v. Hill, (Del. Super) 71 A. 2'd 425. 
The Diaz case has no application here. As pointed 
out by Judge Wolfe in Llew·elyn v. Industrial Com.mis-
sion, supra, cited by plaintiffs: 
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"The case of Diaz et al. v. Industrial Cotntni~­
sion, 80 Utah 77, 13 P. 2d 307, is not in point. 
While there was ample evidence of dependency, 
even though the husband and wife lived apart be-
cause of conditions other than any revealed fault 
of either spouse, the case was decided on the 
ground that the husband's death by pneun1onia 
was not due to any injury received in his employ-
ment. Therefore, the discussion by Mr. ,J usti<'e 
·straup on the question as to whether under the 
facts there was dependency was dicta .. " 
In the Llewelyn case all this court did was to say 
that an award to a wife for separate maintenance indi-
cated dependency even though the husband had not paid 
the award. No such situation is present in the case at 
bar. 
We have no objection to the definition of "depend-
ency" from the case of Hancock v. Industrial Commis-
si'on, supra. However this court in another case cited by 
plaintiffs, Utah Galena Corporation v. Industrial Com-
mission of Utah, supra, quotes from Honnold, Work-
men's Compensation, a more complete· definition as fol-
lows: 
"It may be said in general terms that a 'de-
pendent' is one who looks to another for support, 
one dep·endent upon another for the ordinary ne-
cessities of life for a person of his class and posi-
tion " * * * 
' 
"It follows that dependency does not depend 
on whether the alleged dependents could support 
themselves without decedent's earnings, or so re-
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duce their expenses so that they would be sup-
ported independent of his earnings, but on whether 
they were in fact supported in whole or in part by 
such earnings, under circumstances indicating an 
intent on the part of the deceased to furnish such 
support." 
The same case quoted from 28 R.C.L. pages 770 and 
771 as follows : 
"As a very general proposition it may be said 
that a dependent is one who looked to or relied 
on the decedent for support and maintenance. Re-
liance must have been placed upon the deceased 
employee to provide the applicant for compensa-
tion, in some measure or to some extent, with 
his or her future living expenses. * * * The pur-
pose of the statute is to provide the workman's de-
pendent in future with something in substitution 
for what has been lost by the workman's death, 
and, consequently, to establish dependency the ap-
plicant for compensation must show that he or she 
had reasonable grounds to anticipate future sup-
port from the decedent. This reasonable e~p·ecta­
tion of continuing or future support and mainten-
ance seems to be the true criterion as to who are 
dependents." 
In the Galena case there was actual proof of depend-
ency on the part of the minors sufficient to sustain an 
award in their favor. 
The two McGarry cases both denied compensation. 
The first one because there were no facts showing de-
pendency and the second because of procedural matters. 
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In the case at bar, the presumption of dependency 
is eliminated by the testimony of Mrs. Earley herself. 
Not only was there no reasonable expectation of continu-
ing or future sup·port, but her evidence shows that neither 
she nor the children lost anything by reason of the death 
of Mcintyre. There is no evidence that they had any rea-
sonable ground to expect future support. In fact; the 
evidence is all the other way; that so far as they were 
concerned he had passed out of their lives. Nor would it 
serve any purpose of the compensation law to 1nake an 
award against us in this case. None of the applicants lost 
anything by reason of the employment of Mcintyre by us. 
We employed him as a single man. At that time he was. 
completely out of touch with his family, furnishing them 
no support, and they were expecting none from him. Ap-
parently another (Earley) had taken his place. The ex-
peditiousness with which the former Mrs. l\!clntyre mar-
ried Earley indicates a close prior association. Mcintyre 
was only employed by us for four days. We didn't take 
anything away from his -wife or children. Any value 
he was to them was lost before he came to work for us. 
In the case of Utah Fuel Company v. Industrial Com-
mission, supra, c.ompensation was denied. The court 
through Judge Folland uses this language: 
"There is no proof that deceased had contri-
buted anything to the support of the minors since 
the separation from his wife, and there is no com-
petent evidence in the record as to the financial 
condition of the minors or their mother nor how 
or by whom they had been supported." 
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In the case at bar there is competent evidence in the 
record that neither the wife nor the children relied upon 
the deceased for support at the time of his death, and 
there is evidence in the record as to how they were sup-
ported. So far as the record shows all of them were 
amply supported without any contributions frorn the de-
ceased. 
Judge F'olland further in the opinion says: 
"There is, however, in evidence not anything 
shown on which to rest a finding that this right 
(of support) is of practical value or that it is rea-
sonably probable that the obligation of the father 
would be fulfilled. The mere fact that the father 
is legally and morally bound to supp,ort his chil-
dren does not necessarily establish that they were 
partly or wholly dependent on him .. " (Italics 
added) 
After that case our statute was amended so that 
proof of the relationship alone would eliminate the neces-
sity of the applicant supplying further proof to make 
a prima facie case, but when the applicant herself estab-
lishes that there is no dependency in fact, those facts 
overcome the presumption and there is no course other 
than to deny compensation. 
The plaintiffs assert that even if our statute is not 
conclusive the record compels a finding of dependency 
both for the wife and the children. As we have already 
pointed out to establish dependency, absent the presump-
tion, there must be a reasonable expectation of support 
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either upon legal or moral grounds or from past experi-
ence. · There is not a word of evidence in this record that 
either the wife or her children ever looked to the deceased 
for future support or expected any from hiin. He had 
passed completely out of their lives until Mrs. Earley 
supposed she saw an opportunity to secure compensation 
on account of the death of the deceased. She is looking 
to herself and Earley for support of herself and the chil-
dren and she neither sought nor expected any support 
from Mcintyre. 
The very fact that Mrs. Earley and Mcintyre had 
lived together for 15 years and then without any given 
reason he picks up and leaves, she immediately files for a 
divorce on the· ground of desertion, and most expeditious-
ly after his supposed death enters into a marriage with 
Earley with whom she has been employed for a period be-
fore the departure of her husband, and that she makes 
no effort whatever to hold her husband to his legal re-
sponsibilities, at least indicates a reason for her hasty 
remarriage and her failure to assert heT rights against 
Mcintyre. 
Upon the record in this case there could not even 
have been an award for partial dependency. There is no 
evidence at all that the children or the wife were expect-
ing or needed anything from Mcintyre. If there could be 
no award for partial dependency, of course, there could 
be no award for total dependency. 
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CONCLUSION 
It appears to us that even if it can be asserted that 
our employee was the husband of Mrs. Earley and the 
father of her children, in spite of the unsatisfactory rec-
ord and the unexplained death certificate, that the record 
also shows beyond a doubt that neither Mrs. Earley nor 
her children were actual or legal dependents of our em-
ployee at the time of his employment or at the time of his 
death. The Industrial Commission should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
PE.TER M. LOWE 
Deputy Attorney General 
SHIR.LEY P. JONES. 
SHIRLEY P. JONE·s, JR. 
Attorneys for Defendarnts 
411 Utah Oil Building 
S'alt Lake City 1, Utah 
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